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INCITEMENT TO HATRED: SHOULD THERE BE A
LIMIT?*
Nadine Strossen"
I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1 am honored to address this important forum, celebrating Southern
Illinois University Law School's distinguished founding dean, Hiram Lesar,
and his dedication to civil rights.
I was asked to discuss the American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU)
strong defense of freedom of speech, even for speech that conveys bias or
advocates discrimination.
I realize that this topic is of special concern on your campus now, given
the controversy surrounding Southern Illinois University Law School's recent
graduate, Matthew Hale, leader of the white supremacist "World Church of
the Creator." Although Hale passed the Illinois bar exam and pledged to
abide by all requirements for bar membership, including the non-
discriminatory treatment of individuals seeking legal services, the state bar
authorities nonetheless rejected his membership application because of his
racist beliefs, statements, and associations.' Of course, freedom of thought,
expression, and association are fundamental rights protected by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution (as well as counterpart
provisions in the Illinois state constitution and the constitutions of every other
state). The ensuing controversy drew nationwide-and even
international-attention, and yet again raised the recurrent question of whether
First Amendment freedoms should extend to what is commonly called "hate
speech."
Consistent with the ACLU's signature mission to neutrally defend all
fundamental freedoms for all individuals, no matter who they are or what they
* This essay is based on the Hiram H. Lesar Distinguished Lecture, which Nadine Strossen delivered
at Southern Illinois University School of Law on March 8, 2000.
* National President, American Civil Liberties Union; Professor of Law, New York Law School. For
research and administrative assistance with this piece, Professor Strossen thanks her Academic
Assistant, Kathy Davis, and her Research Assistants Hilary Buyea, Elisaferontianos, Judith Krauss,
Mara Levy, April Myers, Daniel Parisi, and Janice Purvis.
I. In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (I1. 1999).
2. See, e.g., Editorial, White Supremacist Denies Himself Entrance to Bar, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLICENCER, June 30,2000, at AI8; World Report United States, White Supremacist Denied
Law License, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto, Can.), June 27,2000 at Al l.
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believe,3 we defended Matthew Hale's rights to express his racist views
through speaking, writing, organizing, and advocacy, so long as he did not
express such views through discriminatory or illegal conduct. Just as Hale
should not be able to use his sought-after status as a member of the Illinois
bar-and, hence, an officer of the state court system-to discriminate against
any individual, correspondingly, we argued, no other court or bar official
should be empowered to discriminate against any individual, including Hale
himself. Indeed, we argued that state officials should not be permitted to
conduct inquisitions into any bar applicant's beliefs, so long as the applicant
pledged to abide by all rules of professional responsibility, including those
mandating non-discrimination."
The Hale case is simply the latest local entry in a long litany of cases
from all over the world that present the important, enduring questions about
the appropriate legal status of hate speech. I welcome your invitation to use
the Hale controversy as a springboard for exploring those general questions.
The term "hate speech" is apt in two senses. First, the speech expresses
hateful thoughts toward certain individuals and groups-for example, racial or
other minorities. Second, all of us who believe that all human beings are
entitled to full and equal rights hate the diametrically different thoughts
expressed by the likes of Matthew Hale.
This "double-barreled" hateful content does notjustify suppressing hate
speech. To the contrary, as famously explained by former Supreme Court
Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes: "[I]f there is any principle of the
Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is
the principle of free thought-not free thought for those who agree with us but
freedom for the thought that we hate."'
As Holmes' statement indicates, the ACLU position on hate speech has
been incorporated into United States law, through the Supreme Court's
decisions interpreting and enforcing the First Amendment. Hence, in
defending freedom for hate speech, I speak not only for my organization, but
also for my country and its Constitution. Moreover, this position has been
endorsed by some human rights organizations in other countries and by some
international human rights organizations.
Our position is not that government may never restrict speech, but rather,
that it may do so only under very limited circumstances. In a nutshell,
3. See Ken Chowder, The ACLU Defends Everybody, SMITHSONIAN, Jan. 1998, at 86.
4. Amicus Brief of American Civil Liberties Union of Illinois at 3, In re Hale, 723 N.E.2d 206 (III.
1999) (No. 16075). Although this view ultimately did not prevail in the Illinois Supreme Court,
it was endorsed by the lone dissenter, Justice Heiple. Id.
5. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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government may suppress speech only if necessary to prevent a clear and
present danger of actual or imminent harm. Examples of speech that would
satisfy this appropriately strict standard are: threats of violence; targeted
verbal harassment, focused on one individual or a small group; and intentional
incitement of imminent violent conduct or other illegal conduct.
What I have said so far summarizes my answer to the specific question
I was asked to address: "Should there be a limit to incitement to hatred?" My
answer is "Yes," but only under the narrow circumstances specified by
modem United States law: only if the speaker intended to incite imminent
violence or illegal conduct and was likely to actually incite such conduct.
From now on, when I refer to censorship of hate speech, I am referring to
suppression of speech that does not pose a "clear and present danger."
Recently, we have heard many arguments in favor of relaxing American
law's traditional, speech-protective standard, and allowing government to
suppress hate speech that does not satisfy the "clear and present danger" test.
This speech-protective standard has long distinguished the United States apart
from other countries that generally protect human rights, including free
speech.6 Moreover, since the 1980s, the United States legal system's
protection of hate speech has been subject to vociferous criticism by some
human rights advocates in the United States.7 That criticism initially fueled
calls for "hate speech codes" on college and university campuses." More
recently, with the advent of the Internet, that criticism has focused on calls for
restricting online hate speech. 9
Coincidentally, tomorrow night, I am going to participate in a major
program on Internet hate speech that is being sponsored by the Anti-
Defamation League (ADL) in New York City. The ADL is well known for
staunchly and effectively fighting against prejudice. I think it is not as well
known, though, that the ADL also staunchly and effectively fights against
censorship, including censorship of prejudiced ideas or hate speech. That is
true in the Internet context too.
Ever since the Internet became a household word, the ADL has been
monitoring online hate speech, including biased disinformation, such as so-
6. See Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The Historical and Theoretical Foundations of
International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKLEY. J. INT'L. L. 3 (1964).
7. See, e.g., MARIJ. MATSUDA, WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AnAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (Westview Press, 1993).
8. See Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal? in HATE SPEECH
ON CAMPUS: CASES, CASE STUDIES, AND COMMENTARY (Milton Heumann & Thomas W. Church
eds., 1997).
9. See, e.g., Peter H. Lewis, Group Urges an Internet Ban on Hate Groups' Messages, THE N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 10, 1996 at A10.
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called "Holocaust revisionism" -the Big Lie that the Holocaust was a Big Lie.
The ADL maintains its own informative Web site'" and publishes reports to
counter cyberhate. It also urges others to do the same, to take advantage of
the new technology to pursue the constitutionally appropriate-and
effective-response to speech with which we disagree: not censorship, but
rather, counterspeech. For example, the ADL's first comprehensive report
on online hate speech, The Web ofiHate, concludes as follows: "What can and
must be done is clear. People of goodwill must continuously monitor the
Internet... to counter messages of hate with information that challenges
bigotry, exposes the bigots, and promotes tolerance, decency, and truth."'"
The ADL also has reaffirmed its opposition to suppressing hate speech
in the context of the Hale case, which I described above. The Chicago office
of the ADL has supported Matthew Hale's right to practice law, noting that
the same rationale that has been invoked to deny his attorney's license could
also serve to exclude individuals who hold unpopular views on other
controversial issues, ranging from abortion to school prayer. 2
Hate speech has sparked growing controversy not only in the United
States, but also in many other countries recently, especially as movements for
human rights and democracy have been spreading all over the world. I have
participated in many such debates in other countries. 3 Across the various
settings, though, the debates all center on the same basic issues. Therefore,
I am not going to confine my discussion specifically to hate speech codes on
United States campuses, a topic that I understand is of special interest on this
campus. Instead, I hope to shed light on that particular topic by addressing the
broader issues concerning hate speech generally.
On campus and elsewhere, advocates of restricting hate speech have
raised important concerns. They argue that hate speech has led to
discrimination and violence against minority groups and other groups that are
relatively powerless in the political system, such as women. Conversely, they
argue that suppressing hate speech would reduce intergroup violence and
discrimination. Thus, advocates of restricting hate speech see a tension
10. See Anti-Defamation League at <http://www.adl.org> (visited Feb. 8, 2001).
11. See Hate on the www: A Brief Guide to Cyberspace Bigotry at <http://www.ad.orgspecia1
reports/hate on www.html> (visited Feb. 8, 2001).
12. See Pam Belluck, Avowed White Racist is Denied Illinois Law License; Ruling Ignites Free Speech
Fight, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 14, 1999, at A6.
13. See e.g., Nadine Strossen, Freedom for the Thought that We Hate, LMMAGAzINE(UK), Sept. 1993,
at 16; Nadine Strossen, Streitfall Porno: Amerikas Feministinner debailieren iber Zensur und
Meinungsfreiheit, SPIEGEL, Oct. 1997 (Spiegel Special: "Liebe, Laster, Literatur");Nadine Strossen,




between First Amendment free speech rights and Fourteenth Amendment
equality rights.
The ACLU takes these claims very seriously. Throughout the ACLU's
80-plus-year history, we always have been as dedicated to rights of equality
and non-discrimination as we have been to free speech rights. This was
noted, for example, in a comprehensive history of the ACLU that recently was
published by none other than the Southern Illinois University Press: "From
the outset, the ACLU challenged racial discrimination and segregation .....
Roger Baldwin, [the ACLU's principal organizer and its first Executive
Director], was recognized as an advocate for black Americans [and as such
was] in a distinct minority among white Americans."4
Throughout our history, the ACLU had also defended free speech rights
to engage in hateful expression. But we undertook a critical re-examination
of that position a dozen years ago-as we regularly re-examine many of our
positions-when some civil rights advocates first started calling for campus
hate speech codes, making the then-new equality-based arguments in favor of
these codes.
I hasten to emphasize the word some. Many civil rights advocates and
minority group leaders have strongly opposed restrictions on hate speech.
That is specifically true in the Matthew Hale situation. For example,
advocates of Hale's bar admission include the syndicated Chicago Tribune
columnist, Clarence Page, an African-American whose writings regularly
advocate civil rights," and one of Hale's own lawyers, Anita Rivkin-
Carothers, an African-American civil rights lawyer.'
6
Because the ACLU has always fought for equality of educational
opportunities, we carefully considered arguments by advocates of campus hate
speech codes that these codes were necessary to promote true equality of
educational opportunity. However, based on that analysis, the ACLU loudly
reaffirmed our traditional speech-protective position. We did so not because
we elevated free speech rights above equality rights. Rather, we did so
because we concluded that censoring hate speech would not in fact foster
equality, but, to the contrary, might well undermine equality.
7
14. See SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 34
(1999).
15. See Clarence Page, Candid Bigotry Should Not Block Racists Right to Practice Law, THE FRESNO
BEE, Feb. 18, 1999, at B9.
16. See Stebbins Jefferson, Defending the Constitution, Not Hate, THE PALM BEACH POST, Sept. 11,
1999, at IA.
17. See Free Speech andBias on College Campuses, POLICYGUIDEOFTHEAMERICANCIVILLIBERTIES
UNION, at Policy No. 72a (adopted by the ACLU National Board of Directors, without dissent, on
October 13, 1990).
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This was the conclusion of a 1995 book that I co-authored, entitled
Speaking of Race, Speaking of Sex: Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and Civil
Liberties."8 It is a collection of six essays, including several by leading
members of minority groups and advocates of their rights-for example, Henry
Louis (Skip) Gates, the African-American scholar and writer who is Chair of
the Afro-American Studies Department at Harvard University, and Anthony
Griffin, a prominent African-American civil rights lawyer. Every essay
concludes that censoring hate speech may well do more harm than good to the
vitally important causes of promoting equality and combating discrimination.
Alas, racial discrimination and other forms of discrimination and
discriminatory violence are still endemic in the United States, as well as in
many other countries. Therefore, I consider it tragic that so much energy has
been spent on the most superficial manifestation of these deep-seated
problems of racism and other prejudices: namely, a few words. I say "a few,"
because even those who advocate restrictions on hate speech recognize that
such restrictions can punish only the most blatant, crudest expressions of
racism; the more subtle, and hence the more insidious, expressions will
necessarily go unredressed. My co-author Skip Gates made this point in our
book with characteristic flair. He wrote: "In American society today, the real
power commanded by racism is likely to vary inversely with the vulgarity
with which it is expressed... Unfortunately, those who [advocate restrictions]
... worry more about speech codes than coded speech."' 9
Instead of banning a few of the crudest, most superficial symptoms of
discriminatory attitudes, we should turn to more effective, constructive
measures to counter the root causes of such attitudes, as well as actual acts of
discrimination and violence.
My discussion thus far lays out the overview of the ACLU's position on
the important topic you asked me to address. Now I will elaborate on the key
points in this position. I will first explain why hate speech restrictions violate
core First Amendment principles and why it is vitally important to continue
to enforce those principles. Then, I will discuss why hate speech restrictions
are at best ineffective, and at worst counterproductive, in redressing
discrimination and promoting equality.
18. See generally HENRY LOUIS GATES ET AL., SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH,
CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1994).
19. Id. at47.
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II. THE CASE FOR MAINTAINING TRADITIONAL FIRST
AMENDMENT STANDARDS
The ACLU staunchly supports the traditional, strictly speech-protective,
First Amendment standards concerning hate speech, and opposes any
relaxation even in the alleged service of such laudable goals as promoting
equality and reducing discrimination. As I already noted, though, the
traditional standards do not provide that all speech is absolutely protected.
Thus, in the campus context, we would not oppose a code that simply
reflected longstanding, legitimate limits on speech that the ACLU never has
opposed in any other context-for example, prohibitions on threats. On this
point, the relevant ACLU policy reads as follows:
This policy does not prohibit colleges and universities from enacting
disciplinary codes aimed at restricting acts of harassment, intimidation and
invasion of privacy. Although these are imprecise terms susceptible of
impermissibly overbroad application, each term defines a type of conduct
which is legally proscribed in many jurisdictions when directed at a specific
individual or individuals and when intended to frighten, coerce, or
unreasonably harry or intrude upon its target. Threatening telephone calls to
a minority student's dormitory room, for example, would be proscribable
conduct under the terms of this policy. Expressive behavior which has no
other effect than to create an unpleasant learning environment, however,
would not be the proper subject of regulation.
The fact that words may be used in connection with otherwise actionable
conduct does not immunize such conduct from appropriate regulation. For
example, intimidating phone calls, threats of attack, extortion and blackmail
are unprotected forms of conduct which include an element of verbal or
written expression.2"
A. Restricting Hate Speech Would Violate Cardinal Free Speech Principles
To allow restrictions on hate speech beyond these traditional, contextual
limitations on all speech-in other words, to allow restrictions on hate speech
because of its offensive content-would violate the two most fundamental
principles underlying the First Amendment's free speech guarantee. The first
20. See Free Speech andBlas on College Campuses, POLICY GUIDE OFTHE AMERICAN CIVIL LiBERTIES
UNION, at Policy No. 72a & n.4 (adopted by the ACLU National Board of Directors, without dissent,
on October 13, 1990).
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such principle specifies what is a sufficientjustification for restricting speech,
and the second prescribes what is not a sufficient justification.
I already have touched on the first cardinal free speech principle, which
is often encapsulated by the phrase, "clear and present danger." It holds that
a restriction on speech may be justified only when necessary to avert
imminent harm to an interest of compelling importance, such as physical
safety. As former Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes observed
in a much-quoted opinion, consistent with this principle, the First Amendment
would not protect someone who falsely shouted "Fire!" in a theater and
caused a panic.2'
To be restricted consistent with this principle, the speech must clearly
pose an imminent, substantial danger. Allowing speech to be curtailed on the
speculative basis that it might indirectly lead to some possible harm sometime
in the future would inevitably unravel free speech protection. All speech
might lead to some potential danger at some future point. As Justice Holmes
put it, "[elvery idea is an incitement."2 Therefore, under such a watered-
down approach, scarcely any idea would be safe, and surely no idea that
challenged the status quo would be.
Until the i 960s, the United States Supreme Court did apply this relaxed,
so-called "bad tendency" approach to free speech. Over dissents by such
respected Justices as Holmes and Brandeis, the Court allowed government to
suppress any speech that might have a tendency to lead to some future harm."
This approach endangered all critics of government policy and advocates of
political reform. For example, during the World War I era, thousands of
Americans were imprisoned for peacefully criticizing United States
participation in the war and other government policies. Likewise, at the
height-or depth-of the Cold War, members of left-wing political groups were
imprisoned for criticizing capitalism or advocating socialism.
In light of this history, it is ironic that people toward the left of the
political spectrum would now champion a return to the censorial standards
that were so long used to suppress their ideas. Yet, that is precisely what the
advocates of hate speech codes are doing.
In the modem era, the Supreme Court has resoundingly repudiated this
bad tendency rationale for suppressing controversial speech. In the modern
era, moreover, the high Court has recognized the crucial distinction between
advocacy of violent or unlawful conduct, which is protected, and intentional,
21. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
22. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925).
23. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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imminent incitement of such conduct, which is not. The Court enshrined this
distinction in a landmark 1969 ACLU case, Brandenburg v. Ohio.24 In
Brandenburg, the Court unanimously upheld the First Amendment rights of
a Ku Klux Klan leader who addressed a rally of supporters, some of whom
brandished firearms and advocated violence and discrimination against Jews
and blacks.21 The Court held that this generalized advocacy was neither
intended nor likely to cause immediate violent or unlawful conduct, and
therefore could not be punished.2"
Notably, the Supreme Court consistently has applied Brandenburg's
critical distinction between protected advocacy and unprotected incitement to
shelter incendiary expression of every stripe-not only racist hate speech, but
also fiery rhetoric in support of civil rights causes and protests.27
Once again, the recent controversy surrounding Matthew Hale's case is
instructive. The Illinois authorities denied his license to practice law because
of his advocacy of white supremacist views, with no allegation-let alone
evidence-that he had crossed the line between protected advocacy and
prohibited incitement. If the United States Supreme Court had applied a
similar standard in the important 1982 case of NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware,2 the NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People) and its leaders would have faced severe penalties that would
have threatened the ongoing viability of this leading civil rights organization.
In stark contrast with the stance of Illinois bar officials and judges toward
Matthew Hale, who was punished for advocating peaceful law reform to
enshrine his racist views, the Supreme Court held that NAACP leaders had a
First Amendment right to advocate not only violence, but indeed violence
against African-Americans. Specifically, the Court protected the right of
NAACP leaders to advocate violent reprisals against individuals who violated
an NAACP-organized boycott of white merchants who allegedly had engaged
in racial discrimination.29 Even though some violence was subsequently
committed against blacks who patronized white merchants, it occurred weeks
or months after the inflammatory addresses. Accordingly, in a major victory
for the civil rights cause, as well as for free speech principles, the Supreme
24. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
25. Id. at 445.
26. Id. at 449.
27. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
28. Id.
29. On April 21, Charles Evers gave a... speech to several hundred people, in which he... called for
a discharge of the police force and for a total boycott of all white-owned businesses in Claibome
County. Although this speech was not recorded, the chancellor found that Evers stated: "If we catch
any of you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna break your damn neck." Id. at 902.
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Court overturned a lower court ruling that had declared the boycott unlawful
and held the NAACP responsible for white merchants' large financial losses.30
The Court explained the fundamental free speech principles at stake as
follows:
The [NAACP leaders'] addresses generally contained an impassioned plea
for black citizens to unify, to support and respect each other, and to realize
the political and economic power available to them. In the course of those
pleas, strong language was used .... Strong and effective extemporaneous
rhetoric cannot be nicely channeled in purely dulcet phrases. An advocate
must be free to stimulate his audience with spontaneous and emotional
appeals for unity and action in a common cause .... To rule otherwise
would ignore the "profound national commitment" that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'"
The second fundamental free speech principle that would be violated by
suppressing hate speech requires "content neutrality" or "viewpoint
neutrality." It holds that government may never limit speech just because any
listener-or even, indeed, the majority of the community-disagrees with or is
offended by its content or the viewpoint it conveys. The Supreme Court has
called this the "bedrock principle" of our proud free speech tradition under
American law.32 In recent years, the Court has steadfastly enforced this
fundamental principle to protect speech that conveys ideas that are deeply
unpopular with or offensive to many, if not most, Americans-for example,
burning an American flag in a political demonstration against national
policies,33 or burning a cross near the home of an African-American family
that had recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. 4
The viewpoint-neutrality principle was also essential to protect expression
by pro-civil rights demonstrators during the Civil Rights Movement in the
1960s. In many Southern communities where Martin Luther King, Jr., and
other civil rights activists demonstrated and aired their ideas, their views were
seen as deeply offensive, abhorrent, and dangerous to traditional community
mores and values concerning racial segregation and discrimination. Efforts
30. Id. at 934.
31. 1d. at928.
32. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
33. Id at 399; United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990).
34. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). The Court recognized that this symbolic expression
could be constitutionally prohibited under many laws, such as those prohibiting arson, vandalism,
and trespass; it stressed, though, that this expression could not be prohibited under a law that
focused on the ideas it conveyed-namely, a city ordinance that prohibited expression that "arouses
anger, alarm or resentment ... on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at 391.
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to censor and punish these expressions, though, were thwarted by court rulings
enforcing the viewpoint-neutrality principle. 5
So this core principle is firmly entrenched in United States law. But it
still meets a lot of public resistance, at least on first impression. I can
illustrate this through a story about my own beloved father. After he retired,
Dad moved to San Diego. About 15 years ago, I was invited to give a lecture
there, following some well-publicized, ugly incidents of anti-Semitic and
racist expression. I was asked to explain why the ACLU defends free speech
even for racist and religious bigots, and why we win those cases.
My father came to hear my talk. Now, mind you, he was not a card-
carrying ACLU member! But he still came because he had not heard me give
a speech since my high school commencement address-which, incidentally,
he also disagreed with! Anyway, he listened very attentively. Afterwards, he
came up to me and said: "I appreciate that excellent explanation of ACLU
positions and constitutional law. I now understand that the ACLU is correctly
interpreting the First Amendment. Thank you for making it clear to me that
the problem is the First Amendment."
I don't mean to pick on my dear Dad unfairly. To the contrary, his
reaction was quite typical. Most people don't realize the importance of
defending free speech for ideas that they find outrageous until or unless their
own ideas are subject to censorship because other people find them
outrageous.
Let me cite another story that makes this point. It involves an African-
American schoolteacher in Florida named Bill Maxwell. He wrote a
newspaper column about this incident, with this telling title: "ACLU is
Quintessential American Group." Bill Maxwell's column refers to the ACLU
case that, above all others, epitomizes not only the ACLU's commitment to
viewpoint-neutrality, but also our Constitution's commitment. This case
comes from right here in Illinois. I am talking about the famous-or
infamous-"Skokie case," in which we defended the free speech rights of neo-
Nazis to march in Skokie, Illinois.36 As you may know, that city has a large
Jewish population; even more poignantly, at the time of the case, it had a large
population of Holocaust survivors.
While the Skokie case was-and still is-very controversial among the
general public, it was very straightforward as a legal matter, involving a
classic application of the "viewpoint-neutrality" principle. Still, Bill
Maxwell's experience confirms that these principles are hard to accept as
such-namely, as abstract principles-and that they make far more sense to
35. See infra Section III C, A Robust Freedom of Speech is Especially Important for Advancing
Egalitarian Causes.
36. Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party, 69111. 2d 605 (1978); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978)).
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most people when they bring about some concrete, practical, personal benefit
for them, or for people whose ideas they share. Here is what he wrote:
Like millions of other Americans, I have a love/hate relationship with
the ACLU. I donate money to it because I support its absolutist positions on
civil liberties. Often, though, I curse this high-minded group and swear I'll
never give it another dime.
The last time I fell out of love and canceled my membership was in
1977, when the ACLU defended the right of the American Nazi Party to
demonstrate in Skokie, Illinois.
Ironically, I needed the ACLU a year later when three [other] black
teachers and I tried to distribute a handbill critical of our university's hiring
policies. No other teachers or administrators supported us. In fact, placards
produced by our colleagues labeled us as "racists," "niggers" and "educated
monkeys." But the ACLU took our case and won. Our attorney explained
that although the university community saw us as "obnoxious subversives,"
we had a constitutional right to speak.
Suddenly, I recalled the Skokie Nazis. The next day I mailed a check to
the ACLU."'
B. A Counterspeech Strategy is Both Principled and Pragmatic
The viewpoint-neutrality principle reflects the philosophy, first stated in
pathbreaking opinions by former United States Supreme Court Justices Oliver
Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis, that the appropriate response to speech
with which one disagrees in a free society is not censorship but
counterspeech-more speech, not less. Persuasion, not coercion, is the
solution. 38 Accordingly, the appropriate response to hate speech is not to
censor it, but to answer it. Recall, as I discussed earlier, that this is the
strategy that the Anti-Defamation League has been pursuing so effectively in
response to Internet hate speech.
37. Letter from Bill Maxwell to Nadine Strossen (on file with the author).
38. See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring):
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and fearless
reasoning... no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present,
unless the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose through
discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the processes of
education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.
[Vol. 25
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This counterspeech strategy is better than censorship not only in principle,
but also from a practical perspective. That is because of the potentially
empowering experience of responding to hate speech with counterspeech. I
say "potentially," since I realize that the pain, anger and other negative
emotions provoked by being the target of hate speech could well have an
incapacitating effect on some targeted individuals, preventing them from
engaging in counterspeech. Even in such a situation, though, other members
of the community who are outraged by the hate speech could engage in
counterspeech, and that is likely to have a more positive impact than a
censorial response. Furthermore, once other community members denounce
the hate speech, it should be easier for the target to join them in doing so.
I will illustrate these practical benefits of a non-censorial, counterspeech
response to hate speech in the campus context. Far from being paternalistic,
counterspeech is empowering to students; it transforms students who would
otherwise be seen-and see themselves-largely as victims into activists and
reformers. It underscores their dignity, rather than undermines it.
One excellent example of the effective use of counterspeech comes from
Arizona State University (ASU) in Tempe, Arizona. Under the leadership of
a law professor on that campus, Charles Calleros, the faculty and
administration rejected any code that outlawed hate speech or punished
students who expressed it. Instead, they endorsed an educational or
counterspeech response to any hate speech. Significantly, as a Latino, Charles
Calleros is himself a member of a minority group. As such, though, he
believes that stifling or punishing hate speech is no better for advancing non-
discrimination and equality than it is for free speech. And, based on his
university's actual experience with the non-censorial, more-speech response
to hate speech, Professor Calleros' original speech-protective views have been
reinforced.
Professor Calleros has written articles about the positive impact of the
non-censorial approach to hate speech at ASU, explaining how it has been
empowering and supportive for the would-be "victims" of the hate speech,
and also educational and promotive of tolerance and anti-discrimination
values for the university community as a whole.39 Because it is so instructive,
I would like to quote at some length Professor Calleros' description of the first
39. Charles R. Calleros, Paternalism, Counterspeech, and Campus Hate-Speech Codes: A Reply to
Delgado and Yun, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1249 (1995); Charles R. Calleros, Reconciliation of CivilRights
and Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After R.A. V v. City of St. Paul: Free Speech, Antiharassment
Policies, Multicultural Education, and Political Correctness at Arizona State University, 1992
UTAH L. REv. 1205 (1992).
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hate speech incident under ASU's pro-educational, non-censorial campus
policy:
[F]our black women students... were understandably outraged when
they noticed a racially degrading poster near the residence of a friend they
were visiting in Cholla, a campus dormitory. Rather than simply complain
to their friends ... they took positive action. First, they spoke with a
Resident Assistant who told them that they could express their feelings to the
owners of the poster and encourage them to remove it .... The students
knocked on the door that displayed the racist poster and expressed their
outrage in the strongest terms to the occupant who answered the door ....
He agreed that the poster was inappropriate, removed it, and allowed the
women to make a photocopy of it.
[T]he four students then met with the staff director of Cholla. That
director set up a [meeting] for all members of Cholla .... [A] capacity
crowd showed up .... All seemed to accept the challenging conclusion that
the poster was protected by the First Amendment, and I regard what followed
as a model example of constructive response.
First, the black women who discovered the poster explained as perhaps
only they could why the poster hurt them deeply .... The Anglo-American
students assured the black women that they did not share the stereotypes
reflected in the poster, yet all agreed that they would benefit from learning
more about other cultures. The group reached a consensus that they would
support ASU's Black History events and would work toward developing
multicultural programming at Cholla. The four women who led the
discussion expressed their desire to meet with the residents of the offending
dormitory room to exchange views and to educate them about their feelings
and about the danger of stereotyping. I understand that the owner of the
poster is planning to publish an apology in this newspaper today and a
personal communication with the four women would be an excellent follow-
up ....
The entire University community then poured its energy into the kind of
constructive action and dialogue that took place in the Cholla meeting.
Students organized an open forum. The message was this: at most, a few
individuals on a campus think that the racist poster is humorous; in contrast,
a great number of demonstrators represent the more prevalent campus view
that degrading racial stereotypes are destructive. Such a message is infinitely
more effective than disciplining the students who displayed the racist
poster.40
In addition to empowering the students who encountered the racist poster
and educating the students who had displayed it, the non-censorial response
40. Letter to the Editor, African-American Women Respnd to Poster with Courage, Intelligence, STATE
PRESS, Feb. 15, 1991, at 5.
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to this hate speech incident also galvanized constructive steps to counter bias
campus-wide. One of the student leaders of this constructive college-wide
response was Rossie Turman, who was then Chairman of the African-
American Coalition at Arizona State University. Turman's leadership in
supporting both free speech and non-discrimination earned him much
recognition, including an award from the Anti-Defamation League. As one
press account stated:
Turman and other campus minority group leaders handled their anger by
calling a press conference and rally to voice their concerns and allow
students and administrators to speak .... Within days, the ASU Faculty
Senate passed a previously-proposed domestic diversity course requirement.
Turman said: "When you get a chance to swing at racism, and you do, you
feel more confident about doing it the next time. It was a personal feeling of
empowerment, that I don't have to take that kind of stupidity .... The
sickest thing would have been if the racists had been kicked out, the
university sued, and people were forced to defend these folks. It would have
been a momentary victory, but we would have lost the war."
After this incident, Rossie Turman went on to be elected student body
President at ASU, the first African-American to hold that position on a
campus that had an African-American student population of only 2.3%. Upon
his graduation from college, he went to Columbia Law School. Therefore, for
him, what could have been a disempowering, victimizing experience with hate
speech became instead an empowering, leadership-development
experience-not despite the absence of censorship-but precisely because of it.
In contrast with the more-speech response to hate speech adopted by
Arizona State University, a censorial response does not empower the
maligned students. To the contrary, it may well perpetuate their victimization.
Worse yet, ironically, censoring hate speech may well empower verbal
abusers, by making them into free speech martyrs. This point was captured
by the Progressive magazine:
[T]he attempt to ban or punish hateful speech does nothing at all to empower
the presumed victims of bigotry. Instead, it compels them to seek the
protection of authorities whose own commitment to justice is often, to put it
mildly, less than vigorous. Restraining speech increases the dependency of
minorities and other victims of hate and oppression. Instead of empowering
them, it enfeebles them.4
41. The Speech We Hate, PROGRESSIVE MAGAZINE, Aug. 8, 1992.
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III. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF SUPPRESSING HATE SPEECH
Censoring hate speech is doubly flawed. Not only does it violate
fundamental free speech principles, as I have just explained, but worse yet, it
does so with no countervailing benefit. Many advocates of suppressing hate
speech hope thereby to promote equality and non-discrimination. In practice,
though, censoring hate speech is at best ineffective in promoting these
important goals, and at worst counterproductive.
A. Suppressing Hate Speech Does Not Advance Equality
Based on actual experience and observations in countries around the
world, the respected international human rights organization, Human Rights
Watch, concluded that suppressing hate speech does not effectively promote
equality or reduce discrimination. In 1992, Human Rights Watch issued a
report and policy statement opposing any restrictions on hate speech that go
beyond the narrow confines permitted by traditional First Amendment
principles. Human Rights Watch's policy statement explains its position as
follows:
The Human Rights Watch policy attempts to apply free speech
principles in the anti-discrimination context in a manner that is respectful of
both concerns, believing that they are complementary, not contradictory.
While we recognize that the policy is closer to the American legal approach
than to that of any other nation, it was arrived at after a careful review of the
experience of many other countries .... This review has made clear that
there is little connection in practice between draconian "hate speech" laws
and the lessening of ethnic and racial violence or tension. Furthermore, most
of the nations which invoke "hate speech" laws have a long way to go in
implementing the provisions of the Convention for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination calling for the elimination of racial discrimination. Laws that
penalize speech or membership are also subject to abuse by the dominant
racial or ethnic group. Some of the most stringent "hate speech" laws, for
example, have long been in force in South Africa, where they have been used
almost exclusively against the black majority.42
Similar conclusions were generated by an international conference in
1991 organized by the international free speech organization, Article 19,
42. HUMAN RiOHTs WATCH, 'Hate Speech' and Freedom of Expression, A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
POLICY PAPER, Mar. 1992, at 4.
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which is named after the free speech guarantee in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights. That conference brought together human rights activists,
lawyers, and scholars, from fifteen different countries, to compare notes on
the actual impact that anti-hate-speech laws had in promoting equality, and
countering bias and discrimination, in their respective countries. The
conference papers were subsequently published in a book, StrikingA Balance:
Hate Speech, Free Speech, and Non-Discrimination.43 The conclusion of all
these papers was clear: not even any correlation, let alone any causal
relationship, could be shown between the enforcement of anti-hate-speech
laws by the governments in particular countries and an improvement in
equality or inter-group relations in those countries. In fact, often there was an
inverse relationship. These findings were summarized in the book's
concluding chapter by Sandra Coliver, who was then Article 19's Legal
Director:
Laws which restrict hate speech have been flagrantly abused by the
authorities. Thus, the laws in Sri Lanka and South Africa have been used
almost exclusively against the oppressed and politically weakest
communities. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union these laws
were vehicles for the persecution of critics who were often also victims of
state-tolerated or sponsored anti-Semitism. Selective or lax enforcement by
the authorities, including in the United Kingdom, Israel and the former
Soviet Union, allows governments to compromise the right of dissent and
inevitably leads to feelings of alienation among minority groups.
Such laws may also distract from the need for effective legislation to
promote non-discrimination. The rise of racism and xenophobia throughout
Europe, despite laws restricting racist speech, calls into question the
effectiveness of such laws in the promotion of tolerance and non-
discrimination. One worrying phenomenon is the sanitized language now
adopted to avoid prosecution by prominent racists in Britain, France, Israel
and other countries, which may have the effect of making their hateful
messages more acceptable to a broader audience."
Many other illustrations of the unconstructive impact of censoring hate
speech can be drawn from history. One situation that may be foremost on
many of our minds is that of Germany under Adolf Hitler. Given the
unparalleled horrors of the Holocaust, surely even the most diehard free
speech champions would support censorship if we could be persuaded that it
43. STRIKING A BALANCE: HATE SPEECH, FREE SPEECH, ANDNoN-DISCRIMINATION (Sandra Coliver ed.,
1992).
44. Sandra Coliver, Hate Speech Laws: Do They Work?, supra note 43, at 373-74.
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might have averted that tragedy. Speaking for myself, as the daughter of a
German-born Holocaust survivor, that is certainly the case.
I know that this perspective is resonant with many members of the
Southern Illinois University community, because of your concern about the
locally educated but nationally notorious white supremacist, Matthew Hale,
who has endorsed many of Hitler's horrific views, including white supremacy
and anti-Semitism. Indeed, the Committee on Character and Fitness of the
Illinois Bar cited Hale's ideological allegiance to Hitler as a purported
justification for its refusal to admit him: "If the civilized world had no
experience with Hitler, Matthew Hale might be dismissed as a harmless
'crackpot."''
The historical record makes clear, however, that censorship was no more
effective a response to the rise of anti-Semitic hatred in Germany's pre-Hitler
era than it has been in other circumstances. This point was discussed in a
1990 Canadian Supreme Court opinion, considering a constitutional challenge
to Canada's anti-hate speech law:
Remarkably, pre-Hitler Germany had laws very much likethe Canadian anti-
hate [speech] law. Moreover, those laws were enforced with some vigor.
During the 15 years before Hitler came to power, there were more than 200
prosecutions based on anti-Semitic speech. And, in the opinion of the
leading Jewish organization of that era, no more than 10% of the cases were
mishandled by the authorities. As subsequent history so painfully testifies,
this type of legislation proved ineffectual on the one occasion when there
was a real argument for it. Indeed, there is some indication that the Nazis of
pre-Hitler Germany shrewdly exploited their criminal trials in order to
increase the size of their constituency. They used the trials as platforms to
propagate their message.'
B. Censoring Hate Speech May Do More Harm Than Good For Equality Rights
The authorities I have cited so far summarize some of the many reasons
why censoring hate speech may well do more harm than good in terms of
45. In re Hale, Committee on Character and Fitness for the Third Appellate District of the Supreme
Court of Illinois (1998). As the opinion was forced to acknowledge, Matthew Hale had not
threatened to exterminate anyone. It then relied on an explicitly speculative potential connection
between some views and some conduct, noting that "extermination is sometimes not far behind
when governmental power is held by persons of his racial views." Id. Not only does this qualified
generalization not refer directly to Hale himself- to the contrary, it expressly refers to government
officials, and Hale neither held, nor had any foreseeable prospect of holding, government office.
46. R. v. Keegstra, Supreme Court of Canada, 61 C.C.C. 3d I; II W.C.B.2d 352 (Dec. 13, 1990).
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countering bias and discrimination. Let me list the most important such
reasons now:
* Censoring hate speech increases attention to, and sympathy for, bigots.
* It drives bigoted expression and ideas underground, thus making response
more difficult.
* It is inevitably enforced disproportionately against speech by and on behalf
of members of minority groups.
• It reinforces paternalistic stereotypes about members of minority groups,
suggesting that they need special protection from offensive speech.
" It increases resentment against members of minority groups, the presumed
beneficiaries of the censorship.
• Censoring hate speech undermines a mainstay of equal rights movements,
which have always been especially dependent on a robust concept of free
speech.
• An anti-hate-speech policy curbs candid intergroup dialogue concerning
racism and other forms of bias, which is an essential precondition for
reducing discrimination.
" Positive intergroup relations will more likely result from education, free
discussion, and the airing of misunderstandings and insensitivity, rather than
from legal battles; in contrast, anti-hate-speech rules will continue to
generate litigation and other forms of controversy that increase intergroup
tensions.
" Last but far from least, censorship is diversionary, making it easier to avoid
coming to grips with less convenient and more expensive, but ultimately
more meaningful, strategies for combating discrimination. Censoring
discriminatory expression diverts us from the essential goals of eradicating
discriminatory attitudes and conduct.
I will now expand on three of the most important of the foregoing reasons
for concluding that censoring hate speech would be as inimical to equality
rights as to free speech rights.
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C. A Robust Freedom of Speech is Especially Important for Advancing
Egalitarian Causes
First and foremost, all those who seek equal rights have an especially
important stake in securing free speech. For example, as I have already noted,
the Civil Rights Movement in the United States was dependent on a robust
concept of free speech, one that was capacious enough to 'encompass hate
speech. Critical to the success of that movement were the landmark rulings
of the United States Supreme Court under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl
Warren-not only the Warren Court's rulings dealing directly with the
Constitution's equal rights guarantee, but also its rulings upholding a strong
concept of free speech, even for the most provocative and controversial
speech.47
Important as the Court's equal protection rulings were for advancing the
civil rights cause, those rulings could not even have been achieved, let alone
effectively implemented, without the organizing and litigating efforts of the
NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People),
without the speeches and demonstrations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and other
civil rights leaders and activists, and without the press coverage that
mobilized the support of the American public and of the national government.
All of these essential foundations for advances in civil rights depended
upon the Warren Court's broad, vigorous conception of free speech-a
conception sufficiently broad and vigorous that it necessarily also
encompassed hate speech and other forms of speech that now are said to
undermine equality. The Warren Court record conclusively shows that, in the
words of historian Samuel Walker, "The . . . civil rights movement...
depended on the First Amendment."'
Civil rights leaders concur in thisjudgment. In the words of Benjamin L.
Hooks, former Executive Director of the NAACP, "The civil rights movement
would have been vastly different without the shield and spear of the First
Amendment." 9 Likewise, Eleanor Holmes Norton, an African-American
woman who served as Director of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, and who now represents the District of Columbia in Congress,
succinctly summarized the positive, symbiotic relationship between free
47. For a fuller discussion of this theme, see Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court,
in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE 68-84 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
48. SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU 241 (Oxford
University Press 1999) (1990).
49. Statement quoted in Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., Press Release (May 7, 1990).
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speech and equality during the Civil Rights Movement; she said, "There was
always the First."
In his 1994 book, Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy,
Samuel Walker shows that, throughout the twentieth century, the equality
rights of African-Americans and other minority groups were dependent on a
robust free speech concept. He further shows that, realizing the importance
of protecting even speech viewed as hateful or dangerous-because their own
speech certainly was so viewed in many Southern and other communities-the
major American civil rights organizations consistently opposed efforts to
restrict hate speech. As Walker concluded, "The lessons of the civil rights
movement were that the interests of racial minorities and powerless groups
were best protected through the broadest, most content-neutral protection of
speech."'"
In his 1965 book, The Negro and the First Amendment, University of
Chicago Law Professor Harry Kalven documented that the Civil Rights
Movement depended on free speech principles. These principles allowed
protestors to carry their messages to audiences who found them highly
offensive and threatening to their most deeply cherished views of themselves
and their way of life. Equating civil rights activists with Communists,
subversives, and criminals, government officials mounted inquisitions against
the NAACP, seeking compulsory disclosure of its membership lists and
endangering the members'jobs and lives. As Kalven concluded, "Only strong
principles of free speech and association could-and did-protect the drive for
desegregation." 2
Martin Luther King, Jr., wrote his historic letter from a Birmingham jail,"3
but the Birmingham parade ordinance that King and other demonstrators had
violated eventually was declared an unconstitutional invasion of their free
speech rights.54 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which these
demonstrators championed, did become law.
The more disruptive forms of civil rights protest, such as marches, sit-ins,
and kneel-ins-which some observers credit as being the most effective-were
all especially dependent on generous judicial constructions of the free speech
50. WALKER, supra note 48 at 120.
5I. SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY at 126 (Univ. of
Nebraska Press, 1994).
52. HARRY KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1965).
53. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE
ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 289 (James M. Washington ed.,
HarperCollins 1986).
54. Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
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guarantee." Notably, many of these protective interpretations initially had
been formulated in cases brought on behalf of anti-civil rights demonstrators.
But the same principles and precedents also sheltered the insulting and often
racist language that militant black activists hurled at police officers and other
government officials.'
An awareness of these principles and practicalities is precisely what
prompted the African-American civil rights lawyer, Anita Rivkin-Carothers,
to represent the white supremacist Matthew Hale in his effort to secure a
license to practice law in Illinois. One journalist paraphrased his interview
with her on this point as follows:
She urges her critics to remember that without First Amendment rights, the
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King never would have marched. Without free
speech protection, Julian Bond-having called the Vietnam War racially
discriminatory-would have been barred from taking the seat in the Georgia
legislature to which he had been duly elected. She would remind Muslims,
among her harshest critics in the Chicago area, that Louis Farrakhan could
not speak his beliefs without the First Amendment."
Significantly, the ACLU has come to the defense of the free speech rights
of every single one of the individuals whom Rivkin-Carothers cites-Martin
Luther King, Jr., Julian Bond, and Louis Farrakhan alike-since all of their
views have been deemed dangerous and subversive by some authorities in
some places at some points in our history. Therefore, all of them-along with
Matthew Hale himself-have been vehicles for protecting the overarching free
speech rights at stake for the benefit of everyone in this country, just as
Rivkin-Carothers stated.
The same insight was emphasized by another African-American civil
rights advocate who also defended Hale's right to practice law, journalist
Clarence Page. In a syndicated column explaining-why Hale should not be
denied bar admission, Page wrote: "The First Amendment swings both ways
and so does every effort to restrict it. Attempts to silence unpopular minority
55. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S.
111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,550 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963).
56. See Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914(1972); Goodingv. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,523(1972); Lewis
v. New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974).




views at one extreme inevitably swing back to squash minority views on the
other side." 8
The mutually reinforcing relationship between a strong free speech
guarantee and equality rights obtains for other equality movements, in
addition to the Civil Rights Movement on behalf of African-Americans. For
example, the movements for women's rights and reproductive freedom always
have depended upon strong protection of free speech for ideas that many
communities have seen as wrong, offensive, and dangerous. Conversely,
censorship has always been a particularly potent weapon for thwarting
advances in women's rights, including reproductive freedom. The same
pattern holds for the lesbian and gay rights movement. I explore these
mutually-reinforcing relationships between equality and free speech more
thoroughly in my book, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex, and the
Fight for Women's Rights."
Indeed, for one of our newest civil rights movements-on behalf of
lesbians, gay men, and other sexual-orientation minorities-defending free
speech is essentially indistinguishable from promoting equality rights.' The
first essential step for lesbians and gay men in seeking equal rights is "coming
out of the closet," or publicly acknowledging their sexual orientation. This
act is at once an exercise of free speech rights and an assertion of equality
rights.
Conversely, those who discriminate against lesbians and gay men often
simultaneously attack their free speech and equality rights. A prime example
is the United States military's exclusionary "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy. '
Under this policy, even the most outstanding, brave, and patriotic service
members will be drummed out not only for engaging in homosexual conduct,
but also forjust saying something that indicates their sexual orientation, even
if they had never engaged in any actual homosexual conduct. That is
the"Don't Tell" prong of the policy.
Accordingly, in the ACLU's constitutional challenge to this policy, which
we brought jointly with the Lambda Legal Defense Fund, we argued that it is
58. Clarence Page, CandldlBigotry Should Not Block Racist's Right to Practice Law, THE FRESNO BEE
Feb. 18, at B9.
59. NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S
RIGHTS, 224-29 (New York Univ. Press 2000).
60. See, e.g., William B. Rubenstein, Since When is the Fourteenth Amendment Our Route to Equality?
Some Reflections on the Construction ofthe 'Hate-Speech' Debatefrom aLesbian/GayPerspective,
in SPEAKING OF RACE, SPEAKING OF SEX: HATE SPEECH, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
280-99 (1995).
61. National Defense Authorization Act § 571, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1993).
20011
Southern Illinois University Law Journal
doubly unconstitutional, violating both equality and free speech rights, and the
lower court agreed with us on both scores.62
D. Censorship Consistently Has Been Used to Suppress Civil Rights
Causes
Just as free speech always has been the strongest weapon to advance equal
rights causes, correspondingly, censorship always has been the strongest
weapon to thwart them.
Ironically, the explanation for this pattern lies in the very analysis of those
who want to curb hate speech. They contend that racial minorities and women
are relatively disempowered and marginalized. I agree with that analysis of
the problem, and am deeply committed to working toward solving it. Indeed,
I am proud that the ACLU is, and always has been, on the forefront of the
struggles for racial justice, women's rights, and other equality movements.
I strongly disagree, though, that censorship is a solution for our society's
persistent discrimination. To the contrary, precisely because women and
minorities are relatively powerless, it makes no sense to hand the power
structure yet another tool that it can and will use to further suppress them, in
two senses of the word "suppress"-both stifling their expression and
repressing their efforts to enjoy full and equal human rights.
Consistent with the analysis of the censorship advocates themselves, the
government is likely to wield this tool, along with all others, to the particular
disadvantage of already disempowered groups. Laws censoring hate speech
are inevitably enforced disproportionately against speech by and on behalf of
groups who lack political power, including government critics, and even
members of the very minority groups who are the laws' intended
beneficiaries. As I previously noted, this was precisely the conclusion
reached by the respected international human rights organizations, Human
Rights Watch and Article 19, citing examples ranging from South Africa to
the former Soviet Union.
Other illustrations abound. For example, the Turkish government has
invoked its law against inciting racial hatred to bring thousands of
prosecutions against Turkish writers,journalists, academicians, and scientists
62. Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1997), rev/d, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998).
Although the appellate court ultimately overturned our lower court victory, it stressed that it was
simply following a long line of Supreme Court precedents requiring extreme judicial deference to
the military; accordingly, the appellate court essentially rubber-stamped the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
rule, without subjecting it to any meaningful constitutional scrutiny. Id. at 633. Given these
precedents, the ACLU and Lambda decided not to seek Supreme Court review.
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who have criticized the government's war against Kurdish separatists. In
1995, the Turkish government prosecuted a United States journalist accused
of "inciting hatred" by writing an article on that same topic.63 Likewise,
Singapore's authoritarian, long-time governing party has sued the main
opposition party, the Workers' Party, for inciting racial hatred.64 Just as this
article was going to press, on February 19, 2001, Britain launched a
prosecution for racist abuse against a longtime anti-nuclear activist because
she had dragged a United States flag on the ground during a demonstration
against the controversial "Son of Star Wars" missile defense system at the
United States military base in North Yorkshire, England. The prosecution
charged that this action was motived by "racist hatred" of the American
people and caused "harassment, alarm and distress" to United States
personnel who drove out of the base during the demonstration.
These examples are consistent with a worldwide pattern throughout
history. That pattern prompted a trenchant comment from former United
States Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, dissenting from a 1952 decision
that upheld a hate speech law from right here in Illinois. Fortunately, that
ruling since has been implicitly overturned by later Supreme Court
decisions,65 thus vindicating Justice Black's prescient dissent. That dissent
warned, invoking the concept of a pyrrhic victory: "If there be minority
groups who hail this holding as their victory, they might consider the possible
relevancy of this ancient remark: Another such victory and I am undone."
Recall the episode from Arizona State University that I described earlier, in
which the African-American student leader, Rossie Turman, explained why
punishing students who engaged in hate speech would have been an
ineffective strategy, as well as an unprincipled one. In his words: "It would
have been a momentary victory, but we would have lost the war."
Consistent with the general historical pattern, the first individuals
prosecuted under the British Race Relations Act of 1965, which criminalized
the incitement of racial hatred, were black power leaders. Their overtly racist
messages undoubtedly expressed legitimate anger at real discrimination, yet
the statute drew no such fine lines, nor could any similar law possibly do so.
Rather than curbing speech offensive to minorities, this British law instead
has been used regularly to curb the speech of blacks, trade unionists, and anti-
63. Kelly Couturier, US. Reporter Caught Up in Turkey's Crackdown on Press, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Oct. 1I, 1995, at AS.
64. Singapore Leaders Seek Nine Million Dollars from Opponent, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 7,
1997 at CI.
65. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2000).
66. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,275 (1952) (Black, H., dissenting).
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nuclear activists. Perhaps the ultimate irony of this law, intended to restrain
the National Front, a neo-Nazi group, is that it instead has barred expression
by the Anti-Nazi League.
The British experience is typical. None of the anti-Semites who were
responsible for arousing France against Captain Alfred Dreyfus was ever
prosecuted for group libel. But Emile Zola was prosecuted for libeling the
French clergy and military in his classic letter "J'Accuse," and he had to flee
to England to escape punishment.
Similarly, University of Michigan Law School professor Eric Stein has
documented that although the German Criminal Code of 1871 punished
offenses against personal honor, "The German Supreme Court... consistently
refused to apply this article to insults against Jews as a group-although it gave
the benefit of its protection to such groups as Germans living in Prussian
provinces, large landowners, all Christian clerics, German officers, and
Prussian troops who fought in Belgium and Northern France. 6 7
Canada's recently adopted anti-hate-speech law also has led to the
suppression of expression by members of minority groups. In one of their
first enforcement actions under this law, Canadian Customs officials seized
1,500 copies of a book that various Canadian universities had tried to import
from the United States. What was this dangerous racist, sexist book? None
other than Black Looks: Race and Representation by the African-American
feminist scholar, Bell Hooks, who is a professor at Oberlin." And this
incident was not an aberration. Other such perverse applications of the law
were cited by the dissenting opinion in the Canadian Supreme Court decision
upholding this law-by a narrow 5-4 vote-under Canada's Charter of Rights
and Freedom. The dissent noted:
Although [the law] is of relatively recent origin, it has provoked many
questionable actions on the part of the authorities . . . . Intemperate
statements about identifiable groups, particularly if they represent an
unpopular viewpoint, may attract state involvement or calls for police action.
Novels such as Leon Uris' pro-Zionist novel The Ha, face calls for banning.
Other works, such as Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses, are stopped at the
border on the ground that they violate the law. Films may be temporarily
kept out, as happened to a film entitled Nelson Mandela, ordered as an
educational film by Ryerson Polytechnical Institute .... Arrests are even
made for distributing pamphlets containing the words "Yankee Go Home. '69
67. Eric Stein, History against Free Speech: The New German Law against the 'Auschwitz '-and Other
- Lies,'85 MICH. L. REV. 277, 286 (1986).
68. BELL HooKs, BLACK LOOKS: RACE AND REPRESENTATION (South End Press 1992).
69. R. v. Keegstra, Supreme Court of Canada, I I W.C.B. 2d 352; 61 C.C.C. 3d 1 (Dec. 13, 1990).
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This general international and historic pattern also holds true in the
specific, localized, context on which you asked me to focus-namely, on
university and college campuses that enforce hate speech codes. Again, the
British experience is instructive. In 1974, in a move aimed at the National
Front, the British National Union of Students (NUS) adopted a resolution that
representatives of "openly racist and fascist organizations" were to be
prevented from speaking on college campuses "by whatever means necessary
(including disruption of the meeting)." 0 The rule had been designed in large
part to stem an increase in campus anti-Semitism. But following the United
Nations' cue, some British students deemed Zionism a form of racism beyond
the bounds of permitted discussion, and in 1975 British students invoked the
NUS resolution to disrupt speeches by Israelis and Zionists, including the
Israeli ambassador to Great Britain. The intended target of the NUS
resolution, the National Front, applauded this result. The NUS itself, in
contrast, became disenchanted by this and other unintended consequences of
its resolution and repealed it in 1977.
The British experience parallels what has happened in the United States,
as evidenced by the campus hate speech codes for which enforcement
information is available.7 One such code was in effect at the University of
Michigan from April 1988 until October 1989. Because the ACLU brought
a lawsuit to challenge the code (which resulted in a ruling that the code was
unconstitutional),"2 the university was forced to disclose information that
otherwise would have been unavailable to the public about how it had been
enforced. This enforcement record, while not surprising to anyone familiar
with the consistent history of censorship measures, should come as a rude
awakening to any who believes that anti-hate-speech laws will protect or
benefit racial minorities, women, or any other group that traditionally has
suffered discrimination.
Even during the short time that the University of Michigan rule was in
effect, there were more than twenty cases of whites charging blacks with
racist speech. More importantly, there were only two instances in which the
rule punished speech on the ground that it was racist-rather than conveying
some other type of bias-and both involved the punishment of speech by or on
70. ARYEH NEIER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF
FREEDOM 155-57 (E.P. Dutton Univ. Press, 1979).
71. See Nadine Strossen, Frontiers of Legal Thought 11 The New First Amendment: Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal? 1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 554-58.
72. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). The ACLU also successfully
challenged a hate speech code at the University of Wisconsin. UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents
of University of Wisconsin System, 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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behalf of black students. Let me underscore that: 100% of the speech
punished as racist was by or on behalf of African-Americans. Moreover, the
only student who was subjected to a full-fledged disciplinary hearing under
the Michigan rule was an African-American student accused of homophobic
and sexist expression. In seeking clemency from the punishment that was
imposed on him after this hearing, the student asserted that he had been
singled out because of his race and his political views.73
Others who were punished at the University of Michigan included several
Jewish students accused of engaging in anti-Semitic expression (they wrote
graffiti, including a swastika, on a classroom blackboard, saying they intended
it as a practical joke) and an Asian-American student accused of making an
anti-black comment (his allegedly "hateful" remark was to ask why black
people feel discriminated against; he said he raised this question because the
black students in his dormitory tended to socialize together, making him feel
isolated).
Likewise, the student who in 1989 challenged the University of
Connecticut's hate speech policy, under which she had been penalized for an
allegedly homophobic remark, was Asian-American. She claimed that other
students had engaged in similar expression, but that she had been singled out
for punishment because of her ethnic background. Representing this student,
the ACLU persuaded the university to drop the challenged policy.7"
Following the same pattern, the first complaint filed under Trinity
College's then-new policy prohibiting racial harassment, in 1989, was against
an African-American speaker who had been sponsored by a black student
organization, Black-Power Serves itself.
Again, I stress that these examples are not just aberrational. Rather, they
flow from the very premises of those who advocate hate speech codes. As
they rightly note, discrimination and prejudice is, unfortunately, endemic in
United States society-including on campus and in our legal system. Indeed,
exhaustive studies of state and federal courts throughout our country
73. Plaintiff's Exhibit Submitted in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at I, Doe v. University
of Mich., 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-CV-716S3-DT) (black student used termn
'white trash' in conversation with white student); Plaintiff's Exhibit at 5, Doe (No.
89-CV-71683-DT) (at the beginning of a preclinical dentistry course, recognized as difficult,
faculty member led small group discussion, designed to identify concerns of students; dental student
said that he had heard, from his minority roommate, that minorities have a difficult time in the
course and were not treated fairly; the faculty member, who was black, complained that the student
was accusing her of racism).
74. Wu v. University of Conn., No. Civ. H-89-649 PCD (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 1990).
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consistently show entrenched patterns of racial and gender bias." So, for
those of us who are committed to eradicating discrimination, the last thing we
should want to do is to hand over to discriminatory officials and institutions
power to enforce necessarily vague hate speech codes that inevitably call for
subjective, discretionary decisions. This discretionary power predictably will
be used in a way that is hardly helpful to disempowered groups.
E. Censorship is Diversionary
Now I will comment on yet another reason why censoring hate speech
may well undermine, rather than advance, equality causes: its diversionary
nature. Focusing on biased expression diverts us from both the root causes of
prejudice-of which the expression is merely one symptom-and from actual
acts of discrimination.
The track record of campus hate speech codes highlights this problem,
too,just as it highlighted the previous problem I discussed, of discriminatory
enforcement. Too many universities have adopted hate speech codes at the
expense of other policies that would constructively combat bias and promote
tolerance. In fact, some former advocates of campus hate speech codes have
become disillusioned for this very reason. One example is the minority
student who was initially a leading advocate of one of the earliest campus hate
speech codes, at the University of Wisconsin, Victor DeJesus. After the
ACLU successfully challenged that code under the First Amendment, Mr.
DeJesus opposed the University's efforts to rewrite the code in the hope of
coming up with something that would pass constitutional muster. As the New
York Times reported:
Victor DeJesus, co-president of the Wisconsin Student Association, said that
he initially supported the hate speech rule, but that he had changed his mind
because he felt the regents were using it as an excuse to avoid the real
problems of minority students. "Now they can finally start putting their
efforts into some of our major concerns like financial aid, student awareness,
and recruitment retention," Mr. DeJesus said.76
75. Hon. Sharon E. Grubin & Hon. John M. Walker, Report of the Second Circuit Task Force on
Gender, Racial, and Ethnic Fairness in the Courts, N.Y.U. 1997 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 11.
76. U of Wisconsin Repeals Ban on 'Hate Speech, 'N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1992, at A10.
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F. The Less Restrictive Alternatives Are Also More Effective
Recognizing the diversionary nature of campus hate speech codes, the
ACLU policy on this subject expressly urges colleges and universities to
respond to bias through a range of constructive alternatives. These alternative
approaches, all of which could be implemented in the non-campus context as
well, not only are consistent with free speech rights, but also would make a
more meaningful contribution toward reducing intergroup prejudice,
discrimination, and violence.
These recommended approaches embody the "less restrictive alternative"
concept that is so central to the Supreme Court's standards for protecting free
speech and other constitutional rights. The Court consistently has held that
even when government asserts a concern of compelling importance in an
attempt to justify restricting a constitutional right, the restriction is still
unjustified if there is any "less restrictive alternative"-another measure, less
restrictive of the right, that would adequately promote the government's
interest."
In the hate speech context, advocates of restrictions assert countervailing
interests ofgreat importance-reducing discrimination and promoting equality.
However, those interests can be advanced effectively through measures that
are less restrictive of free speech. Indeed, these alternative approaches may
well be not only less restrictive of speech, but also more effective in reducing
discrimination and promoting equality. Above, I argued that censoring hate
speech is doubly-flawed, both violating free speech rights and also ineffective
in advancing equality. The argument I make here is the complement of this
earlier one: that non-censorial responses to hate speech are doubly desirable,
since they both honor free speech rights and also effectively advance equality.
Let me quote the pertinent portion of the ACLU policy:
All students have the right to participate fully in the educational process on
a nondiscriminatory basis. Colleges and universities have an affirmative
obligation to combat racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of bias,
and a responsibility to provide equal opportunities through education. To
address these responsibilities, the ACLU advocates the following actions by
colleges and universities:
(a) to utilize every opportunity to communicate through its administrators,
faculty, and students its commitment to the elimination of all forms of
bigotry on campus;
77. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the Scales through
the Last Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L REV. 1173, 1212 (1988).
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(b) to develop comprehensive plans aimed at reducing prejudice, responding
promptly to incidents of bigotry and discriminatory harassment, and
protecting students from any such further incidents;
(c) to pursue vigorously efforts to attract enough minorities, women and
members of other historically disadvantaged groups as students, faculty
members and administrators to alleviate isolation and to ensure real
integration and diversity in academic life;
(d) to offer and consider whether to require all students to take courses in the
history and meaning of prejudice, including racism, sexism, and other forms
of invidious discrimination;
(e) to establish new-student orientation programs and continuing counseling
programs that enable students of different races, sexes, religions, and sexual
orientations to learn to live with each other outside the classroom;
(f) to review and, where appropriate, revise course offerings as well as
extracurricular programs in order to recognize the contributions of those
whose art, music, literature and leaming have been insufficiently reflected
in the curriculum of many American colleges and universities;
(g) to address the question of defacto segregation in dormitories and other
university facilities; and
(h) to take such other steps as are consistent with the goal of ensuring that all
students have an equal opportunity to do their best work and to participate
fully in campus life."
I would like to comment on a few of these non-censorial strategies for
addressing bias and discrimination, to underscore their efficacy. First, it is
important for people in leadership positions in any community in which hate
speech occurs to denounce and dissociate their institutions from the
discriminatory attitudes that such expression reflects. One good example of
this kind of statement was provided in 1985 by the then-President of Harvard
University, Derek Bok, who circulated a letter to the entire Harvard
community, in response to a sexist flyer that an undergraduate fraternity had
distributed. He wrote:
The wording of the letter was so extreme and derogatory to women that I
wanted to communicate my disapproval publicly, if only to make sure that
no one could gain the false impression that the Harvard administration
harbored any sympathy or complacency toward the tone and substance of the
letter. Such action does not infringe on free speech. Indeed, statements of
disagreement are part and parcel of the open debate that freedom of speech
is meant to encourage; the right to condemn a point of view is as protected
78. Free Speech and Bias on College Campuses, POLICY GUIDE OF THE AMERICAN CIvIL LIBERTIES
UNION, at Policy No. 72a (adopted by the ACLU National Board of Directors, without dissent, on
October 13, 1990).
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as the right to express it. Of course, I recognize that even verbal disapproval
by persons in positions of authority may have inhibiting effects on students.
Nevertheless, this possibility is not sufficient to outweigh the need for
officials to speak out on matters of significance to the community-provided,
of course, that they take no action to penalize the speech of others.79
Likewise, six years later, when some Harvard students displayed
Confederate flags-usually viewed as a racist symbol, particularly offensive
to African-Americans-and another displayed a swastika in response, Harvard
President Bok responded with another thoughtful statement strongly
criticizing the displays but equally strongly defending free speech principles.
He wrote, in part:
To begin with, it is important to distinguish clearly between the
appropriateness of such communications and their status under the First
Amendment. The fact that speech is protected by the First Amendment does
not necessarily mean that it is right, proper, or civil. In this case, I believe
that the vast majority in this community believes that hanging a Confederate
flag in public view-or displaying a swastika in response-is insensitive and
unwise.., because any satisfaction it gives to the students who display these
symbols is far outweighed by the discomfort it causes to many others. I
agree with this view and regret that the Harvard students involved saw fit to
behave in this fashion ....
One reason why the power of censorship is so dangerous is that it is
extremely difficult to decide when a particular communication is offensive
enough to warrant prohibition or to weigh the degree of offensiveness against
the potential value of the communication. If we begin to forbid flags, it is
only a short step to prohibiting offensive speakers. Do we really want
Harvard officials (or anyone else) to begin deciding whether Louis Farrakhan
or Yasser Arafat or David Duke or anyone else should be allowed to speak
on this campus? Those who are still unconvinced should remember the long,
sorry history of preventing Dick Gregory and other civil rights activists from
speaking at Southern universities on grounds that they might prove
"disruptive" or "offensive" to the campus community, not to mention the
earlier exclusion of suspected communists for fear that they would corrupt
students' minds.
In addition, I suspect that no community can expect to become humane
and caring by restricting what its members can say. The worst offenders will
simply find other ways to irritate and insult. Those who are not malicious
but merely insensitive are not likely to learn by having their flags or their
79. Derek Bok, Reflections on Free Speech: An Open Letter to the Harvard Community. EDUC. REC.,
Winter 1985, at 4, 6.
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posters torn down. Once we start to declare certain things "offensive," with
all the excitement and attention that will follow, I fear that... the resulting
publicity will eventually attract more attention to the offensive material than
would ever have occurred otherwise ....
In conclusion, then, our concern for free speech may keep the University
from forcibly removing the offensive flags, but it should not prevent us from
urging the students involved to take more account of the feelings and
sensibilities of others. Most of the time, I suspect, we will succeed in this
endeavor. By so doing, I believe that we will have acted in the manner most
consistent with our ideals as an educational institution and most likely to help
us create a truly understanding, supportive community.80
Moving from the university campus to the larger community, the same
counterspeech strategy was followed by President Bill Clinton in response to
what is frequently termed "hate radio"-call-in talk shows in which the hosts
and listeners harshly criticize the government, government officials, and
particular groups in our society-immediately after the tragic bombing of the
federal building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. Clinton, along with many
others, believed that the anti-government rantings on such radio programs had
fanned the type of sentiments that could well have motivated those
responsible for the bombing. Accordingly, Clinton condemned the ideas
conveyed by "hate radio," while stressing that he was not calling for any kind
of censorial reaction to it. Instead, he exercised his own free speech rights,
from his "bully pulpit," to send a very powerful message against bias and
violence, explaining:
Yes, stand up for freedom of speech. Yes, stand up for all our freedoms,
including the freedom of assembly and the freedom to bear arms .... But
remember this: with freedom ... comes responsibility. And that means that
even as others discharge their freedom of speech, if we think they are being
irresponsible, then we have the duty to stand up and say so to protect our
own freedom of speech."
A study that was done by a professor at Smith College in Massachusetts
demonstrated the effectiveness of this kind of counterspeech in combating
bias and prejudice. It showed that when a student who hears a statement
conveying discriminatory attitudes also promptly hears a rebuttal to that
statement-especially from someone in a leadership position-then the student
will probably not be persuaded by the initial statement. Dr. Fletcher
80. Bok Issues Free Speech Statement, HARVARD UNIvERsrrY GAzETTE, Mar. 15, 1991, at 1, 4.
S1. Remarks to Students at Iowa State University in Ames, 31 WLLY Comp. PRES. Doc. 710 (April
25, 1995).
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Blanchard, a psychologist at the college who conducted the experiment,
concluded that "A few outspoken people who are vigorously anti-racist can
establish the kind of social climate that discourages racist acts.'"'2 Thus, this
study provides empirical social scientific support for the free speech maxim,
discussed above, that the appropriate response to any speech with which one
disagrees is not suppression but rather counterspeech.
Social scientific studies also underscore the efficacy of another non-
censorial alternative to suppressing hate speech: affirmative action measures
to increase the participation of members of minority groups in the relevant
communities. The most pertinent studies have been done on countering
homophobia, but they have implications for redressing other forms of bias as
well. These studies show that the most constructive way to decrease people's
negative attitudes toward lesbians and gay men is to give them an opportunity
to get to know and interact with lesbians and gay men in settings such as
school and work, where they are collaborating on common endeavors."
Accordingly, by helping to ensure that members of various minority or
disempowered groups are represented on campus and in the workplace,
affirmative action measures can play a positive role in reducing present and
future prejudice and discrimination.
Human Rights Watch recently issued a report on discriminatory violence
against ethnic minorities and immigrants in Germany, which tracks the same
approach the ACLU has advocated for United States college campuses."
Like the ACLU, Human Rights Watch opposes restrictions on hate speech, as
I have already explained. Also like the ACLU, Human Rights Watch endorses
alternative non-censorial measures, including punishing actual violent or
discriminatory conduct. In Germany, as in too many other countries and
contexts, speech and association of bigots are too often suppressed while their
violent or discriminatory conduct are too often not effectively curbed. Of
course, though, the appropriate and effective response should be precisely the
opposite.
Paralleling the ACLU's recommendations in the American campus hate
speech context Human Rights Watch urges the German government, at
national and local levels, to undertake affirmative action efforts. It urges the
82. Daniel Goleman, New Way to Battle Bias Fight Acts, Not Feelings, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1991,
at C I; Fletcher A. Blanchard et al, Reducing the Expression of Racial Prejudice, PSYCHOL. Sc. at
101,105 (1991).
83. Lori Soderlind, Rapid Growth of Gay Groups is Sign of Change, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1992, at
13NJ CI.




government to hire members of the embattled minority groups to police forces
and other agencies that deal both with these groups themselves and with the
public at large."5 The Human Rights Watch report on Germany also endorses
another of the alternative measures urged by the ACLU in the United States
campus context: passing and vigorously enforcing laws that punish actual
violent or discriminatory conduct. Here is an excerpt from the Human Rights
Watch report:
This report focuses on acts of violence by right-wing extremists and the
response of the German state. While viewing extremist violence with great
concern, Human Rights Watch at the same time opposes laws that prohibit
the expression of anti-foreigner or anti-Semitic sentiments, as well as laws
that prohibit groups that hold such views from forming associations and
holding public gatherings, so long as that speech, association or assembly
does not rise to the level of incitement to or participation in violence ....
While such measures may be popular politically and may even appear
to be effective in the short-run, Human Rights Watch is concerned that over
the long run such measures are not only not effective to counter bigotry, but
they may even be counterproductive. Draconian bans turn bigots into
victims, driving them underground and creating a more attractive home for
the unstable and insecure people who are drawn to such groups ....
The exercise of these rights in a hateful fashion short of incitement to
violence can best be countered by other forms of speech, association, and
assembly, such as anti-racist demonstrations and anti-racism educational
efforts, without infringing the rights themselves. Furthermore, while
prohibitions on these rights may be adopted to protect minorities, they are
often used by majoritarian governments against minority groups.86
The theme that censoring hate speech is not effective-and may well be
counterproductive-in responding to discrimination in Germany goes back to
pre-Hitler Germany, during the Weimar Republic. The problem was not that
the Nazis enjoyed too much free speech, as I have often heard asserted.
Rather, the problem was that the Nazis got away with murder-literally. They
therefore deprived everyone else-including anti-Nazis, Jews, and other
minorities-of free speech.
This point was forcefully made by Aryeh Neier, a German Jew who
escaped from Nazi Germany to the United States with his immediate family,
but whose extended family was exterminated in the Holocaust. In the late
1970s, Aryeh Neier was Executive Director of the ACLU. In that capacity,
85. d atll.
86. Id at 5, 70-71.
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he led the ACLU's controversial support of the free speech rights at stake in
the Skokie case, which I described above.
To my mind, the single most powerful, eloquent explanation of the
importance of defending freedom for hate speech even from the perspective
of embattled minority groups-indeed, especially from their perspective-is the
book that Aryeh Neier wrote about this case. His theme is well-summed-up
by the book's title: Defending Ay Enemy: American Nazis, the Skokie Case,
and the Risks of Freedom."
Neier's eloquent book refutes common misperceptions about free speech
and the rise of Nazism in Weimar Germany as follows:
The impression that Weimar was a free society is fostered by the great
flowering of arts, music, and theater that took place in Berlin in the 1920s.
But lacking a government with the will and the strength to enforce the
provisions of the constitution and the laws against politically motivated
violence, Weimar did not safeguard the liberties of Germans. The
constitution itself was so lightly regarded that the Nazis didn't bother to
repeal it when they took over. They left it in place but ignored it.
The Nazis did not defeat their political opponents of the 1920s through
the free and open encounter of ideas. They won by terrorizing and
murdering those who opposed them ....
The history of the Weimar Republic ... does not support the views of
those who say that the Nazis must be forbidden to express their views. The
lesson of Germany in the 1920s is that a free society cannot be established
and maintained if it will not act vigorously and forcefully to punish political
violence. It is as if no effort had been made in the United States to punish
the murderers of Medgar Evers, Martin Luther King, Jr.... and the other
victims of the effort in the 1960s to desegregate the Deep South. There
would have been hundreds of additional murders if the federal government
of the United States had not stepped in to bring prosecutions where local law-
enforcement agencies evaded their duty."
Prosecutions of those who commit political violence are an essential part
of the duty the government owes its citizens to protect their freedom to speak.
Violence is the antithesis of speech. Through speech, we try to persuade
others with the force of our ideas. Violence, on the other hand, terrorizes with
the force of arms. It shuts off opposing points of view.
87. ARYEH NEER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RIsKS OF
FREEDOM (E.P. Dutton Univ. Press, 1979).
88. Id. at 164,167.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In concluding, I will continue to focus on the Nazi situation, because it
provides such a strong case study of the misguided nature of the call to
suppress hateful expression as an alleged antidote to hateful attitudes and
conduct. Given the unique horror of the Holocaust, it is not surprising that
even many individuals who support free speech in general want to make an
exception for Nazi expression.
This is true not only in Europe-to-wit, the laws that expressly ban Nazi
speech, symbols, publications, and meetings-but also in the United States.
Thus, while the ACLU prevailed in the courts of law in defending free speech
rights for the neo-Nazis in Skokie,89 consistent with the traditional First
Amendment positions described above, the ACLU's position was
controversial and unpopular in the court of public opinion. Even many ACLU
members-stalwart First Amendment champions in general-resigned from the
organization in protest over this position.
The example of Nazi hate speech is powerful for me not only because it
involved the landmark ACLU case from Skokie, but also for personal reasons,
as I have indicated. My father, who was born in Germany in 1922, was what
the Nazis called "a half-Jew," who barely survived the forced labor camp at
Buchenwald. He was liberated by American soldiers and came to this country
as a refugee after the War. Along with Aryeh Neier, I also have immediate
family members who were tortured and murdered during the Holocaust. Yet,
along with Arych Neier and many other American Jews, I support free speech
forNazis and other anti-Semites not despite my background and my first-hand
experience with the evils of anti-Semitism, but rather, precisely because of
that fact.
I would like to close with two powerful statements explaining this
perspective from two American Jews, both of whom lived in Nazi Germany
as children but escaped to the United States. The first is Gerald Gunther, now
adistinguished emeritus professor of law at Stanford University. Gunther was
the leading opponent of the hate speech code that Stanford ultimately adopted.
It was subsequently struck in a lawsuit that was brought by several Stanford
law students. The students successfully argued that the code violated a
89. Collin v. Smith, 578 F. 2d 1197 (7th Cit.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Village of Skokie v.
National Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978).
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California state statute that protects student free speech even in private
educational institutions. °
Professor Gunther explained that his opposition to censoring hate speech
did not reflect insensitivity to the pain it caused, but to the contrary. Here is
a portion of his powerful plea:
Lest it be said that I unduly slight the pain imposed by expressions of
racial or religious hatred let me add that I have suffered that pain. I
empathize with others who have, and I rest my deep belief in the principles
of the First Amendment in part on my own experiences.
I received my elementary education in a public school in a very small
town in Nazi Germany. I was subjected to vehement anti-Semitic remarks,
from my teacher, my classmates and others. "Judensau" (Jew pig) was far
from the harshest.
My own experiences certainly have not led me to be insensitive to the
myriad pains offensive speech can and often does impose. But the lesson I
have drawn from my childhood in Nazi Germany and my happier adult life
in this country is the need to walk the sometimes difficult path of denouncing
the bigots' hateful ideas with all my power yet at the same time challenging
any community's attempt to suppress hateful ideas by force of law."
The second such statement comes from Aryeh Neier, in his superb book
about the ACLU's Skokie case:
The most frequently repeated line of all in the many letters about Skokie
that I received was: "How can you, a Jew, defend freedom for Nazis?"...
The response I made most often began with a question: "How can 1, a Jew,
refuse to defend freedom, even for Nazis?" Because we Jews are uniquely
vulnerable, I believe we can only win brief respite from persecution in a
society in which encounters are settled by power. As a Jew, therefore, I
want restraints placed on power. I want restraints which prohibit those in
power from interfering with my right to speak, my right to publish, or my
right to gather with others who also feel threatened. To defend myself, I
must restrain power with freedom, even if the temporary beneficiaries are the
enemies of freedom.'
90. Preliminary Order, Corry v. Stanford, No. 740309, Cal. Super. Ct. Santa Clara County Feb. 27,
1995., copy on file with Southern Illinois University Law Journal.
91. Letter from Gerald Gunther to George Parker, chair of the Student Conduct Legislative Council,
Stanford University (Mar. 10, 1989), reprinted in STANFORD UNIV. CAMPUS REP., Mar. 15, 1989,
at 17.
92. ARYEH NEJER, DEFENDING MY ENEMY: AMERICAN NAZIS, THE SKOKIE CASE, AND THE RISKS OF
FREEDOM 4-5 (E.P. Dutton Univ. Press, 1979).
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